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1. Introduction 
Confronted with the rising costs and health risks of environmental degradation associated 
with rapid economic growth, the central governments in Asian countries have gradually 
recognized that the conventional path of encouraging economic growth at the expense of 
the environment cannot be sustained. It has to be changed. They are convinced of the 
need to clean up their countries’ development act. Accordingly, they set environmental 
goals and environmental performance requirements. Environmental ministries or 
equivalent agencies are empowered to take the responsibility. But they are often ill-
equipped with their tasks of enforcing existing regulations and designing, implementing, 
monitoring, inspecting and enforcing new effective environmental polices. 
  
The National Environmental Protection Agency of China was for years seen as a 
powerless entity. While the Chinese President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao 
gave a new lease on life and elevated it from a low vice-ministry rank, then to full 
ministerial status (named as the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA)) and 
currently to the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) under the State Council 
(China’s Cabinet), the MEP still does not have the authority to suspend proposed projects 
violating environmental laws and regulations or to remove officials who should be held 
accountable for this noncompliance. It also lacks the authority to manage local 
environmental bureaus (Zhang, 2007a).  
 
 
Table 1  Maximum Fines by Category of Violators of Environmental Laws and 
Regulations in China 
 
  Applicable Laws  Maximum Fines 
Allowed (10000 Yuan) 
Exceed the pollution limit 
 
Air pollution accidents 
 
EIA violators, imposed only 




Prevention and Control Act 
Atmosphere Pollution 
Prevention and Control Act 
Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) Law 











Source: Zhang (2008). 
 
 
Should the MEP decide to impose a penalty on violators of EIA (environmental impact 
assessment) laws and regulations, as indicated in Table 1, the maximum fine at its 
disposal is just Yuan 200,000 (about US$29,500). Even for environmental accidents as 
serious as the benzene contamination of the Songhuajiang River spill in November 2005 
in Northern China, the incident that had unprecedented international implications as well 
as domestic social, economic and environmental ramifications, the maximum fine by 
China’s current environmental laws is just Yuan 1 million (about US$150,000), which   3
was actually imposed one year after that incident. Moreover, the fine is only allowed to 
be imposed once (Zhang, 2007a). As a result, this low and one-time penalty is hardly a 
deterrent to environmental offenders. To make things worse, even these weak 
punishments allowed by current environmental laws are still weakly enforced in China 
because environmental protection agencies at all levels of the governments are 
underfunded and inadequately staffed. 
 
As a result, poor compliance and weak enforcement are common in developing Asian 
countries. Correcting such a problem requires a major investment in strengthening the 
institutions of environmental governance to ensure that they have the adequate 
institutional, financial and technical capabilities to do the job. This is a necessary step, 
but not enough. The full participation of all stakeholders is needed in protecting the 
environment.  
 
Over the past three decades, many Asian countries have decentralized in the allocation 
and responsibility and have shifted control over resources and decision-making to local 
governments and enterprises. This devolution of decision-making to local levels and 
enterprises has placed environmental stewardship in the hands of local officials and 
polluting enterprises. However, under the current evaluation criterion for officials in 
China, local officials typically have been promoted based on how fast they expand their 
local economies. This distorted incentive system tempts officials to disregard 
environmental costs of growth. Moreover, objectively speaking, the current fiscal system 
in China plays a part in driving local governments to seek higher GDP growth because 
that system makes it hard to reconcile the interests of the central and local governments 
(Zhang, 2008 and 2010a). Since the tax-sharing system was adopted in China in 1994, 
taxes are grouped into taxes collected by the central government, taxes collected by local 
governments, and taxes shared between the central and local governments. All those 
taxes that have steady sources and broad bases and are easily collected, such as the 
consumption tax, tariffs, vehicle purchase tax, are assigned to the central government. 
VAT and income tax are split between the central and local governments, with 75% of 
VAT and 60% of income tax going to the central government. As a result, the central 
government revenue increased by 200% in 1994 relative to its 1993 level. This led the 
share of the central government in the total government revenue to go up to 55.7% in 
1994 from 22.0% in the previous year (see Table 2). In the meantime, the share of the 
central government in the total government expenditure just rose by 2%. By 2009, local 
governments only accounted for 47.6% of the total government revenue, but their 
expenditure accounted for 80.0% of the total government expenditure in China. To enable 
to pay their expenditure for culture and education, supporting agricultural production, 
social security subsidiary, etc, local governments have little choice but to focus on local 
development and GDP. That in turn enabled them to enlarge their tax revenue by 
collecting urban maintenance and development tax, contract tax, arable land occupation 
tax, urban land use tax, etc. 
 
Therefore, effective environmental protection must be placed in this context of 
government decentralization. In this regard, local government’s cooperation is crucial to 
the overall outcomes. As often is the case, what the center wants is not necessarily what   4
the center gets. An old Chinese saying goes, “The mountains are high, and the emperor is 
far away”. Central governments need to let go of the notion that they should or even can 
do it all. Instead, they need to recognize that without local governments’ cooperation to 
get these policies implemented, it is meaningless to set and defend national 
environmental goals, no matter how stringent they are. 
 
 
Table 2  Shares of the Central and Local Governments in the Government Revenue 
and Expenditure in China, 1993-2009 
 



































































































Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2010). 
 
 
Taking China as a focus and in the context of government decentralization, this paper 
first discusses a variety of tactics that the Chinese central government has been using to 
incentivize local governments. The paper then examines a number of economic policies 
aimed to engage the private sector and promote its long-lasting, improved corporate 
energy-saving and environmental performance. Finally, it concludes that there is a clear 
need to carefully examine those objective and subjective factors that lead to the lack of 
local official’s cooperation on the environment, and provides some suggestions for 
appropriated incentives to get their cooperation. 
 
 
2. Incentives for local governments to be more environmentally responsible   5
While China has been calling for energy saving since the early 1980s, the country has set, 
for the first time, the goal of cutting energy intensity by 20% in its current five-year 
(2006-10) economic plan. Industry accounts for about 70% of China’s total energy 
consumption (Zhang, 2003), so that this sector is crucial for China to meet its own set 
energy-saving goal. To that end, China established the “Top 1000 Enterprises Energy 
Conservation Action Program” in April 2006. This program covers 1008 enterprises in 
nine key energy supply and consuming industrial subsectors. These enterprises each 
consumed at least 0.18 million tons of coal equivalent (tce) in 2004, and all together 
consumed 33% of the national total and 47% of industrial energy consumption in 2004. 
The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China’s top economic 
planning agency, sets energy-saving target for each of these enterprises, and all together 
these enterprises are required to achieve the overall energy saving of 100 million tce 
cumulatively during the period 2006-10, thus making a significant contribution to 
China’s overall goal of 20% energy intensity-improvement (NDRC, 2006a). In May 2006, 
empowered by the State Council (China’s Cabinet), the NDRC signed energy-saving 
responsibility agreements with governments of 31 provinces or equivalent to allocate the 
overall energy-saving target of those Top 1000 enterprises in each province or equivalent. 
These governments in turn signed with those Top 1000 enterprises located in their region. 
To ensure that the goal is met, achieving energy efficiency improvements has become a 
criteria for job performance evaluations of the heads of these enterprises. This will help 
them realize that they should take their jobs seriously because they have a very real stake 
in meeting energy-saving goals.  
 
While there are areas that need further improvements (Price et al., 2010), this program  
goes very much as planned as far as energy saving goal is concerned. The first-year’s 
results of its implementation show that more than 95% of these enterprises appointed 
energy managers, and the program achieved the energy savings of 20 million tce in 2006 
(NDRC and NBS, 2007). In 2007, the energy savings of 38.17 million tce were achieved, 
almost doubling the amount of energy savings in 2006 (NDRC, 2008). The results in the 
first two years suggest that the Top 1000 Enterprises Energy Conservation Action 
Program is already more than half way to meet the goal set for 2010. While China has not 
publicly released the results of the program’s performance afterwards, the Chinese 
Minister of Industry and Information was quoted as saying that “those key enterprises 
that each consumes at least 0.18 million tce achieved the overall energy saving of 130 
million tce cumulatively during the first four years of the 11
th five-year plan period” (Liu, 
2010), which has been 30% more than the cumulative goal for the program over the five-
year period. This achievement has not been possible without cooperation of local 
governments because they have taken the responsibility for overseeing a successful 
implementation of those Top 1000 enterprises in their region. 
 
However, this high-profile Top 1000 program should not be generalized when it comes to 
central-local relations. The common case is that local governments’ inability, or non-
cooperation, has been a major reason for the failure to meet energy efficiency and 
environmental goals set by the national government. The Chinese national government 
has implemented policies to shut down plants that are inefficient and highly polluting, 
and to keep the frenzied expansion of offending industries under control (Zhang, 2010a,c).   6
Local officials strongly resist, because these companies provide jobs and create tax 
revenues as well as personal payoffs. Forcing companies out of business could even 
trigger local unrest. One case in point is the differentiated tariffs. The NDRC ordered 
provincial governments to raise power tariffs for eight energy-guzzling industries 
including cement, aluminum, iron and steel, and ferroalloy from October 1, 2006 
onwards. Companies classified as “eliminated types” or “restrained types” in these 
industries are required to pay surcharges that will increase over time, with “encouraged” 
and “permitted” ones charged for the normal tariffs (see Table 3). However it was 
reported that by mid-April 2007, not only had many local governments failed to 
implement the differentiated tariffs that charge more for companies in the “eliminated” or 
“restrained” categories, but 14 of them even continued to offer preferential power tariffs 
for such industries (Zhang, 2007a). In fact, this is not the only time that China’s 
provinces and regions violated this nationwide policy. Some provinces and regions have 
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Source: NDRC (2006b). 
 
 
The results have also been mixed in the closure of small, inefficient coal- and oil-fired 
power plants and energy-inefficient and highly-polluting plants. As the largest coal 
consumer, power generation is currently consuming over half of the total coal used in 
China. This share is expected to rise well above 60% in 2020, given the rapid 
development of coal-fired power generation (Zhang, 2010c). Thus, efficient coal 
combustion and power generation is of paramount importance to China’s endeavor of 
energy-saving and pollution-cutting. To that end, China has adopted the policy of 
accelerating the closure of thousands of small, inefficient coal- and oil-fired power plants. 
Units facing closure include those below 50 MW, those below 100 MW and having in 
operation of over 20 years, and those below 200 MW and having reached the end of their 
design life, those with a coal consumption of 10% higher than the provincial average or 
15% higher than the national average, and those that fail to meet environmental standards 
(Zhang, 2010c). The total combined capacity that needs to be decommissioned is set at 50 
GW during the period 2006-10. Relative to a total capacity of 8.3 GW decommissioned   7
during the period 2001-05, by the end of the first half year of 2009, China had closed 
small plants with a total capacity of 54 GW, having met the 2010 target of 
decommissioned 50 GW one and half years ahead of schedule (Sina Net, 2009b; Zhang, 
2010c). By mid-July 2010, the total capacity of decommissioned smaller and older unites 
had increased to 70 GW, more than the entire current power capacity of the Great Britain 
(Yang, 2010). However, China has been less successful in the areas to shut down energy-
inefficient and highly-polluting plants than in the closure of small, inefficient coal- and 
oil-fired power plants. Following a major pollution incident in July 1994 in the Hui River, 
the central government launched a national campaign to close down some 72000 highly-
polluting town and village industrial enterprises in 15 sub-sectors. However, some 20-
30% restarted, either illegally or after bringing their enterprises into compliance with 
relevant discharge standards (Ma and Ortolano, 2000 and OECD, 2001). Another case is 
the closure of small, inefficient and highly-polluting coal mines for environmental 
reasons and then the reopening of many of these plants for economic reasons. These coal 
mines were ordered to shut down through a widely-publicized nationwide campaign 
beginning in 1998. However, many had reopened because in many cases local 
governments had pushed back to preserve local jobs and generate tax revenues as well as 
personal payoffs. As a result, the coal consumption figures had been revised upwards to 
reflect the unreported coal production mainly from these reopened small, inefficient and 
highly-polluting coal mines. Table 4 shows the preliminary and final values for total 
primary energy consumption and coal consumption in China between 1990 and 2008. 
The preliminary figures for total energy use in 1999-2001 were revised upwards by 8-
10%. In all three years, these adjustments were driven by upward revisions of 8-13% 
made to the coal consumption figures.   
 
Thus, to gain local officials’ cooperation on the environmental issues, incentives need to 
be provided. Under the current evaluation criterion for officials in China, local officials 
typically have been promoted based on how fast they expand their local economies. That 
has created an incentive for officials to tempt to disregard the environmental costs of 
economic growth. To correct this distorted view of local officials’ accomplishments and 
to implant environmental consequences in their minds, environmental performance has to 
be considered as well. If environmental quality does not get improved during the 
official’s tenure, that official should not be promoted. This will help the local officials 
realize that they should take their jobs seriously because they have a very real stake in 
meeting environmental goals.  
 
To that end, the central government of China has been using a variety of tactics to 
incentivize local governments (Zhang, 2007b and 2008). China State Council issued in 
1982 provincial measures for collecting pollution discharge fees. The measures allow 
local environmental protection bureaus (EPB) to retain 20% of the fees charged for 
pollutants exceeding allowable standards. The fees retained, referred to as self-
construction fees, can be used for environmental monitoring, research, training and 
awards. This may motivate local EPBs to increase monitoring and ensure compliance. 
However, local governments consider economic development a priority, and view the 
strict implementation of the over-standard fees as a severe burden on local firms, thus 
hampering local development. This intervention restricts effectiveness of the incentive.   8
Moreover, the incentive itself is an issue open to question. Given their budget shortfalls 
as a result of the central government’s call for self-supporting government agencies and 
local government cuts in their funding, some local EPBs, if not all, have misused this 
incentive as a mechanism to maximize their fee-based revenues and expand their budgets. 
They monitor to collect fees rather than ensure compliance, and reduce monitoring 
frequency and stop monitoring for months once a firm is determined to violate effluent 
standards (Ma and Ortolano, 2000).  
 
 
Table 4  Preliminary and Final Values for Total Primary Energy Consumption and 
Coal Consumption in China, 1990-2008
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Notes: Mtce (million tons of coal equivalent). 
a National Bureau of Statistics of China is expected to adjust both preliminary and final 
values for energy and coal uses to make all statistics consistent, based on the second 
nationwide economic census. But such an adjustment in a comparable way will have little 
effect on a difference between their preliminary and final values. 
b Data on energy and coal consumption in 2008 are preliminary value.
 
Sources: Zhang (2010d,e). 
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Since 1997, the SEPA (the current MEP) has run a model environmental city program. 
Any city, which both meets about 30 specified environmental indicators over the past 
three consecutive years and is among the three best performers of environmental quality 
in a province, is awarded the title. Out of 629 cities in China, 67 had been placed on the 
honor roll by the end of 2008 (MEP, 2009). 
 
To further push local governments on the environmental front, for the first time, on July 
13, 2004, the SEPA unveiled its blacklist of the ten most polluted cities to discourage 
environmentally irresponsible decisions. That shocked local officials who had always 
worked on the assumption that “evil deeds” very seldom saw the light of day (Zhang, 
2007a,b). This public disclosure works effectively because it puts more pressure on local 
officials to take responsibility for the health of their people and to take action. 
Since 2006, the blacklist was expanded to include cities with air quality below the class 
III standard designed for industrial areas. According to the evaluation on the 
environmental quality of Chinese 595 cities in 2006, despite four cities less than the 
number of those blacklisted in the previous year, there were still 39 cities on the SEPA’s 
blacklist (SEPA, 2007a). In the latest evaluation on 629 cities’ environmental quality in 
2008, released on December 21, 2009, the number of the blacklisted cities went down to 
7.
2 Moreover, the category of blacklisted cities was further expanded to include unveiling 
those cities that were unable to undertake online automatic monitoring, were found to 
have not taken the required urban sewage treatment and to have discharged substandard 
waste water, and do not take proper treatment of urban garbage, etc (MEP, 2009). 
 
Aimed to help the general public and officials alike to understand how severely the rising 
environmental degradation associated with its rapid economic growth is, the SEPA and 
the National Bureau of Statistics of China (2006) in September 2006 jointly released the 
first-ever report on economic costs of pollution in 2004. Despite the shortcomings in 
basic data, methodologies and the coverage of items, this report estimates that the 
environmental pollution still costs China US$ 64 billion, or 3.05% of GDP in 2004. This 
sends a warning signal that China’s rampant environmental pollution problem is 
undermining its long-term economic growth. The SEPA is promoting to use the 
                                                 
2 China’s national air quality standards for residential areas is termed the Chinese class II 
standards. The national standards for residential areas are set at the annual average TSP 
(total suspended particulate) and PM10 (particulate matter less than 10 microns in 
diameter) concentrations of 200 and 100 micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m
3), 
respectively. In its latest evaluation of Chinese cities’ environmental quality in 2008, 
76.8% of the Chinese cities were able to meet or go beyond that class II standards (MEP, 
2009). That figure was only 37.6% in 2006 (SEPA, 2007a). This suggests that while there 
is a significant progress in urban air quality, about 23% of the Chinese cities still suffer 
from air pollution resulting in being unable to meet the class II standards that are much 
lower than the WHO guidelines of 90 µg/m
3 for TSP until it was abandoned for this 
particulate form in 2000 (The WHO (2000) abandoned the standards for this particulate 
form because time-series epidemiological studies were unable to define a threshold below 
which no health effects occur) and 20 µg/m
3 for PM10.   10
calculated green GDP instead of traditional GDP as the economic criterion to evaluate the 
real performance of local officials.  
 
The SEPA decided in July 2006 to establish the six regional environmental protection 
inspection centers. Unlike local environmental protection agencies budgeted by local 
governments, these regional centers are directly under the leadership of the national 
environmental regulatory agency. Moreover, they are independent of local governments 
in terms of their budgets and staffs. Thus, they can confront local government’s short-
term intents to better represent national, long-term and general interests, have the 
enhanced capability to inspect and coordinate serious environmental disputes cross 
provincial borders and river basins, correct the distorted information on local 
environmental quality, and rein in the increasing local protectionists (Sina Net, 2007b). 
This is another way to coerce cooperation between the central government and local 
governments as well as cooperation among local governments. 
 
To further enhance the environmental awareness of local officials, the SEPA has 
tightened approval of construction projects by implementing the regional permit 
restrictions. The so-called regional permit restrictions are based on an ancient Chinese 
punishment of incriminating relatives and associates related to the main suspect. On 
January 10, 2007, the SEPA made an unprecedented move, suspending EIA approval of 
any new construction projects in four cities (Tangshan in Hebei province, Luliang in 
Shanxi province, Liupanshui in Guizhou province, and Laiwu in Shandong province) and 
four major national power-generating groups (Datang International, Huaneng Group, 
China Huadian Corp, and China Guodian Corp) until they bring their existing facilities 
into compliance with environmental regulations. Once their EIA approval rights are 
suspended, no new construction projects are allowed to be built in these cities and by 
these power-generating groups until all violators are in compliance with environmental 
regulations. Given that China’s economy is investment-driven, local governments are 
fully aware of the consequences of the suspension of their right to approve new 
construction projects. To disregard the environmental problems in their regions now can 
cost them a lot (Zhang, 2007a).  
 
In fact, this is not for the first time for the SEPA to impose administrative measures to 
punish offenders. Since January 2005, the SEPA has unleashed a series of the so-called 
environmental protection storms. Its first ever such a storm unleashed on January 18, 
2005, blacklisted 30 industrial projects worth Yuan 119.7 billion. Many of these projects 
were considered the so-called “national key projects” approved by the powerful NDRC, 
China’s top economic planning agency. While these projects themselves were not 
necessarily highly polluting, the SEPA called for a halt to these industrial projects, on the 
ground that they had not undergone proper environmental impact assessments. This first 
environmental protection storm served as a public education campaign, increasing the 
awareness of the EIA law. In the second environmental storm in 2006, the EIA law is 
further strengthened, taking it from project level to the deeper level of planning. 163 
proposed projects worth Yuan 774.6 billion were put on hold on enforcing EIA law alone. 
But, the restriction of regional permits is the strictest administrative measure ever taken 
by the SEPA in its 30 years of existence (Zhang, 2007a,b).    11
 
The underlying reason for suspending EIA approval rights is thought to be the desire to 
promote technology upgrading, industrial restructuring and sustainable development. 
Whether it becomes an effective means depends on how local governments and 
companies succeed in changing their attitudes and practices and whether local 
environmental protection agencies work together with the national agency. Otherwise, 
suspending the approval rights only has temporary effects, but does not lead to a long-
term efficacy. 
 
The new regional permit restrictions seem to be effective. Only one month after the 
restrictions suspended approval rights for the four cities, one city, Laiwu, quickly 
responded to the SEPA warnings and recovered its rights; and only two months after the 
suspension, Huaneng Group and China Guodian Corp, the two national power-generating 
groups, came into compliance and recovered their rights (Zhang, 2007a). 
 
While there are hardly any reports on environmental protection storms in China’s media 
since the fourth environmental protection storm unleashed in July 2007 and targeted at 
river basins, the MEP continues to suspend the right of those corporations and provinces 
to approve any new construction projects if there are any violators of environmental 
regulations within these corporations and provinces. For example, once the Ludila 
hydropower project by Huadian Power, and the Longkaikou project by Huaneng Power, 
both located in Lijiang, Yunnan province, were found to illegally block the river for the 
construction effort in January 2010 without reviewing their environmental impact, the 
MEP in June 2010 had ordered the country’s two largest power producers to stop 
building the dams immediately. Moreover, the MEP suspended approval of hydropower 
projects along the middle reaches of Jinsha River, and suspended EIA approval of any 
new construction projects (except for renewable and pollution-abating projects) for the 
two national power-generating groups. Weifang Steel Group Corp in Shandong province 
started constructing a project of producing 5 million tons of steel. Given that this project 
violates the national industrial policy and development plan of steel industry, the MEP is 
suspending EIA approval of any new construction projects in the whole steel sector for 
the whole province (Sina Net, 2009a). 
 
China started implementing the bulletin system to release data on energy use per unit of 
GDP and other indicators by provincial region in 2006 (People’s Daily, 2005). According 
to the first bulletin on energy use per unit of GDP and other indicators for 2006, which 
was released in July 2007, among the 31 Chinese provinces or equivalent, only 
Beijing met energy-saving and emissions-cutting goals in 2006, cutting its energy use per 
unit of GDP by 5.25%, followed by Tianjin, another metropolitan city in China, with the 
energy intensity reduction of 3.98%, Shanghai by 3.71%, Zhejiang by 3.52% and Jiangsu 
by 3.50% (NBS et al., 2007). In 2007, despite concerted efforts towards energy saving, 
the country cut its energy intensity by 4.04% (NBS et al., 2009). There are still big 
variations in energy-saving performance among the 31 Chinese provinces or equivalent. 
Beijing continued to take the lead, cutting its energy intensity by 6%, followed by Tianjin 
by 4.9% and Shanghai by 4.66% (NBS et al., 2008). This clearly indicated Beijing’s 
commitments to the 2008 Green Olympic Games. In the meantime, however, there were   12
seven provinces whose energy-saving performances were below the national average. 
2008 was the first year in which China exceeded the overall annualized target (4.4%) for 
energy saving, cutting its energy intensity by 4.59% (NBS et al., 2009). This was due 
partly to the economic crisis that reduced overall demand, in particular the demand for 
energy-intensive products. Overall, the energy intensity was cut by 14.38% in the first 
four years of the plan relative to its 2005 levels (Xinhua Net, 2010). In July 2010, China 
released its energy intensity number for 2009, and its final energy intensity numbers for 
the years 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008, which are revised based on the second nationwide 
economic census. Based on these revised numbers, China’s energy intensity fell by 
15.61% from 2006-2009 (NBS et al., 2010). The country would meet its energy-saving 
goal if it could cut its energy intensity by 4.39% in 2010. However, China’s energy use 
rose faster than its economic growth in the first half of 2010, with seven provinces 
becoming even more energy intensive during this period. This suggests that the country 
as a whole needs to accomplish the goal set for the whole year only within a half year, 
with some provinces required to fill even big remaining gaps during this period. Given 
the annual energy-saving rate of 5.25% during the period 1980-2000 in which China 
achieved a quadrupling of its GDP while cutting its energy intensity by about three 
quarters (Zhang, 2003), achieving such high energy-saving rate within a half year poses a 
significant challenge for the country as well as for those provinces that lagged behind 
schedule. In this regard, local government’s cooperation is crucial to the overall outcomes 
of cutting the energy intensity target by 20% between 2006 and 2010 relative to its 2005 
level.
3 The SEPA could use its power to suspend the right to approve new construction 
projects in those provinces if they continue noncompliance with the energy-saving and 
environmental goals (Zhang, 2007a). 
 
Moreover, shifting control over resources and decision making to local governments and 
enterprises as the result of the economic reforms in China over the past three decades has 
led to insufficient investment in energy saving, with its share in the total investment in 
the energy industry in China declining from about 13.4% in 1983 to the level of about 3% 
in 2005 (Zhang, 2010a). China needs to increase investment in energy conservation and 
energy efficiency improvements. Faced with the prospect for the failure to meet the 
ambitious energy intensity target, the central government embarked additional Yuan 10 
billion in mid-2007, following Yuan 11.3 billion already allocated in early that year (the 
total of Yuan 21.3 billion, about US$ 3.2 billion or 4.5% of the total investment in the 
energy sector in 2005) specifically for energy saving, of which Yuan 9 billion to support 
the Ten Key Energy-saving Projects, 13 times that of the funding support in 2006 (Yuan 
0.68 billion). This is a helpful step in promoting energy conservation, but the amount of 
fund allocated for energy saving needs to further increase. To encourage local 
governments to eliminate outdated production capacities, there have been repeated calls 
by policy experts for payment of transfer both from the central government to provincial 
governments in the less developed regions and from the provincial governments to those 
                                                 
3 The reliability of both energy use and GDP data matters in meeting this energy intensity 
target. See Zhang (2010d,e) for discussions on the reliability and revisions of China’s 
statistical data on energy and GDP, and their implications for meeting China’s existing 
energy-saving goal in 2010 and its proposed carbon intensity target in 2020.   13
cities and counties in which a large amount of outdated production capacities have been 
closed down. Moreover, the amount of that transfer needs to be indexed with the real 
energy saving as the result of closing down the production capacities (Zhang, 2008 and 
2010a). The Chinese government has gradually recognized the importance of the 
payment of transfer in getting local government’s cooperation. This is reflected by the 
central government’s decision in November 2007 to transfer Yuan 2 billion to provincial 
governments. This is a very positive development, but this amount of payment transfer is 
far short of the needs. It needs to further increase, in particular given that the central 
government only accounts for less than 25% of the country’s total government 
expenditure but receives over 50% of the total government revenue in China (see Table 
2). The good news is that the Chinese central government has recognized these needs, 
increasing the amount of its fund allocated for energy saving to Yuan 41.8 billion in 2008 
(including funding support for urban sewage treatment that was allocated to Yuan 4 
billion in 2007) from Yuan 23.5 billion in 2007 (The State Council, 2008). 2010 is the 
final year of China’s energy efficiency drive of the 11
th five-year plan, but as discussed 
above, China still needs to fill in the big remaining gap to meet its energy saving goal for 
2010. Recognizing how challenging it is, the Chinese central government has doubled the 
amount of its allocated fund for energy saving relative to its level in 2008, earmarking 
Yuan 83.3 billion in 2010 (Xinhua Net, 2010). 
 
 
3. Economic policies and engagement of the private sector 
While governments determine the rules under which businesses act, set environmental 
goals and commit to international environmental agreements, they count on enterprises’ 
full cooperation. After all, the enterprises themselves are entities that make investment, 
use natural resources, produce products and emit pollution. In this regard, having the 
right economic policies is crucial because it sends clear signals to these energy 
consumers, helping polluting enterprises to hold accountable for their environmental 
behavior as well as their profits and costs. Given the widespread use of fossil fuel 
subsidies in developing Asian region, removing these subsidies is essential to provide 
incentives for efficient fuel use and adoption of clean technologies that reduce emissions 
at sources. By definition, a subsidy lowers the cost of production, increases the price 
received by producers or lowers the price paid by consumers. By lowering the prices of 
fossil fuels, such fossil fuel subsidies not only are widely considered to distort 
international trade, but also increase the amount of such fuels consumed and thus the 
amount of harmful emissions (Zhang and Assunção, 2004). China, Indonesia and 
Malaysia are among the developing Asian countries that have since 2005 raised domestic 
energy prices to bring them more into line with international prices. This has led to sharp 
fall in overall energy subsidies in these countries despite rising international prices. For 
example, China cut its total energy subsidies to around US$ 11 billion in 2006. This 
corresponds to a reduction of 58% compared to its 2005 level of around US$ 26 billion 
(IEA, 2006 and 2007). China has since raised its producer prices of gasoline and diesel 
several times. On June 1, 2010, China increased domestic producer price of natural gas 
by 25% (Wan, 2010). In October 2010, the NDRC was soliciting opinions nationwide 
regarding the two proposed options to set up tier-tariffs for household electricity use. 
Despite these long-awaited actions, removing such subsidies is but a first step in getting   14
the energy prices right. Further steps to be taken include incorporating the costs of 
resources themselves to reflect their scarcity and internalizing the costs of externalities. 
For example, current royalties on coal resources in China are based on extraction. That is, 
a coal miner pays certain amount of fees for each ton of coal extracted. As a result, once a 
coal miner obtains mining permits, it mines recklessly. This irresponsible mining 
behavior is very common for small coal mines, and has led to a severe waste of coal 
resources, even to the destruction of coal resources. As would be expected, the coal 
recovery rate is reported to be only 10-15% for small coal mines, implying that more than 
6 tons of coal get wasted for each ton of coal extracted. For the country as a whole, the 
average recovery rate is about 30%,
4 only 60% of the advanced level abroad (He, 2006). 
To avoid wasteful extraction and use of coal, current way in levying royalties on coal 
resources in China should be changed. The rational royalties on coal resources should be 
levied based on revenues rather than volume, indexed with both the quality of reserves 
and recovery rate of coal mines. 
 
3.1 Market-based instruments 
Market-based instruments, such as pollution charges, green taxes, tradeable petmits, and 
penalties for the infringement of environmental regulations, are common ways to 
internalize externality costs into the market prices. Many Asian countries have 
traditionally relied on rigid command-and-control (CAC) approaches. With the poor 
environmental performance of such approaches and the cost and complexity associated 
with their implementation, more and more countries in this region are transforming from 
current reliance on CAC regulations to market-based policy instruments. The added 
abatement costs will be imposed on polluting companies as part of production cost that 
can be reduced by cutting pollution. This is seen to increase not only cost-effectiveness 
but also flexibility in complying with the set environmental regulations. 
 
With one-third of China’s territory widely reported to be affected by acid rain, the 
formation of which SO2, along with NO2, contributes to, reducing SO2 emissions has 
been the key environmental target in China. By amending the 1987 Atmospheric 
Pollution Prevention and Control Act in August 1995, which newly added SO2 emissions 
from coal combustion as the regulated pollutant, China has since 1996 started levying the 
charges for SO2 emissions in the so-called Two Control Zones
5 based on the total 
quantity of emissions and at the rate of 0.20 Yuan per kilo of pollution equivalent (Yu, 
2006). As indicated in Table 5, since July 1, 2003, this charge was applied nationwide 
and the level of this charge was raised step by step. From July 1, 2005 onwards, the 
                                                 
4 Coal recovery rates differ with scale of mines, the level of mining technologies, and 
type of mines. For key state-owned coal mines, the rate is 50%. The corresponding figure 
for surface mines reaches as high as 95%. But their output only accounts for 4.5% of the 
national total production (He, 2006). 
5 The so-called Two Control Zones refer to acid rain control zone and SO2 control zone. 
The former mainly covers the southern and southwestern parts of China where 
precipitation is acid most of the time, whereas the latter covers the northeastern and 
eastern parts of the country where SO2 emissions are very intensive but the acid rain is 
not apparent partly because of the alkaline soils in these areas.   15
charge was applied at the level of 0.60 Yuan per kilo of pollution equivalent. The 
pollutants that are subject to pollution charges are broadened to include NOx as well, 
which is charged at the rate of 0.60 Yuan per kilo of pollution equivalent since July 1, 
2004 (SDPC et al., 2003). To help to meet the energy saving and environmental control 
goals set for the 11
th five-year economic plan, the Chinese government plans by three 
steps to double the charges for SO2 emissions from the existing level to 1.2 Yuan per kilo 
of pollutant equivalent within the next three years (The State Council, 2007). Local 
governments are allowed to raise pollution charges above the national levels. Since 1999, 
Beijing levied charges 1.2 Yuan per kilo of pollution equivalent for SO2 emissions from 
coals of high sulfur content (SDPC et al., 2003). Jiangsu province raised charges for SO2 
emissions from the existing level of 0.6 to 1.2 Yuan per kilo of pollution equivalent from 
July 1, 2007 onwards, three years ahead of the national schedule (People Net, 2007; Sina 
Net, 2007a). China’s Ministry of Finance, the State Administration of Taxation and the 
MEP have proposed for levying environmental taxes to replace current charges for SO2 
emissions and chemical oxygen demand, a water pollution index. This proposal is subject 
to the approval of the State Council. While their exact implementation date has not been 
set yet, it is generally expected to be introduced during the 12
th five-year plan period 
running from 2011 to 2015. As experienced in environmental taxes in other countries 
(Zhang and Baranzini, 2004), such taxes will initially be levied with low rates and limited 
scope, but their levels will increase over time. Once implemented, the long-awaited 
environmental taxes will have the far-reaching effects on technology upgrading, 
industrial restructuring and sustainable development in China. 
 
 
Table 5  Levels of Charges for Atmospheric Pollutants in China 
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Sources: SDPC et al. (2003); The State Council (2007). 
 
 
China has been experimenting with SO2 emissions trading in Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, and 
Zhejiang provinces and Tianjin metropolitan city. Zhejiang province has implemented 
provincial wide trial SO2 emissions quotas that can be purchased and traded since 2009. 
It as well as Jiangsu is experimenting with trading COD (chemical oxygen demand) 
permits in Taihu Basin. In its Jinxing city, 890 enterprises were reported to participate in 
the paid use and trade of pollution quotas by mid-November 2009, representing rising 
trends of both volumes and prices of quotas transacted (CAEP, 2009). Even in Shanxi   16
province, China’s coal and power base, power-generating plants sold SO2 emissions 
quotas to the State Grid. This marks that tradeable permits scheme enters the essentially 
operational stage in the province after years of preparation.  
 
No doubt, economic instruments internalize the externality costs of production, and thus 
provide positive incentives to abate emissions. However, these economic instruments do 
not work to their full potential, although they have a solid economic foundation. In theory, 
cost-conscious companies will generally tolerate pollution up to the point where the 
expected penalty for pollution becomes greater than the cost of cutting emissions. 
However, the charges and fines are often set too low as have been the case in many 
developing countries. The average charge for urban sewage treatment was reported to be 
Yuan 0.7 per ton for 36 large and medium cities in China by the end of 2008, whereas the 
corresponding treatment cost is Yuan 1.1 per ton (NDRC, 2009; CAEP, 2009). Even for 
the aforementioned case of Jiangsu province, where the charges for SO2 emissions at 1.2 
Yuan per kilo of pollution equivalent were levied from July 1, 2007 onwards, three years 
ahead of China’s national schedule, this charge is still less than half of the real abatement 
cost, which is reported to be 3 Yuan per kilo of pollution equivalent for abating SO2 
emissions from coal-fired power plants (Sina Net, 2007a). As a result, many polluting 
companies see their compliance costs higher than the fines, and accordingly choose to 
pay the fines rather than to reduce their pollution. As discussed in Introduction, the low 
penalty is hardly a deterrent to environmental offenders in China. To change this situation, 
pollution charges should be raised to reflect the cost of abating pollution, and the fines for 
offenders should be set higher than the abatement cost. This two together will really 
create incentive for pollution reduction. 
 
3.2 Supportive economic policies 
The central government is also providing supportive economic policies to encourage 
technical progress and strengthen pollution control to meet the energy-saving and 
environmental control goals. To support the Ten Energy-saving Projects, China’s 
Ministry of Finance and the NDRC (2007) award enterprises in East China Yuan 200, 
and enterprises in the Central and Western part of the country Yuan 250 for every tce 
saved per year since August 2007. Such payments are made to enterprises that have 
energy metering and measuring systems in place that can document proved energy 
savings of at least 10000 tce from energy-saving technical transformation projects. 
Moreover, in its current economic blueprint for 2006 to 2010, China incorporated for the 
first time the goal of reducing SO2 emissions by 10% by 2010. With burning coal 
contributing 90% of the national total SO2 emissions and coal-fired power generation 
accounting for half of the national total, the Chinese central government has mandated 
that new coal-fired units must be synchronously equipped with a flue gas 
desulphurization (FGD) facility and that plants built after 1997 must have begun to be 
retrofitted with a FGD facility before 2010. Empowered by the State Council, the MEP 
(then SEPA) in May 2006 signed SO2 emissions-cutting responsibility agreements with 
seven provincial governments and six top national power-generating groups, which 
together account for two-third of total SO2 emissions in China. And, policies favorable to 
FGD-equipped power plants are being implemented, e.g., the on-grid tariff incorporating 
desulphurization cost, priority given to be connected to grids, and being allowed to   17
operate longer than those plants that do not install desulphurization capacity. Some 
provincial governments provide even more favorable policies, leading to priority 
dispatching of power from units with FGD in Shandong and Shanxi provinces. Moreover, 
the capital cost of FGD has fallen from 800 Yuan/kW in the 1990s to the level of about 
200 Yuan/kW (Yu, 2006), thus making it less costly to install FGD facility. As a result, 
newly installed desulphurization capacity in 2006 was greater than the combined total 
over the past 10 years, accounting for 30% of the total installed thermal (mostly coal-
fired) capacity. This helped to slow down the growth rate of SO2 emissions significantly 
in 2006, which was 11.3% less than that in 2005. By 2007, the coal-fired units installed 
with FGD increased to 266 GW from 53 GW in 2005. Generation units with FGD further 
rose to 379 GW in 2008 and 470 GW in 2009. Accordingly, the portion of coal-fired 
units with FGD rose to 51% in 2007, 66% in 2008 and 78% in 2009 of the total installed 
thermal capacity from 13.5% in 2005 (Sina Net, 2009b; Zhang, 2010c; X. Zhu, 2010). As 
a result, by the end of 2009, China had cut its SO2 emissions by 13.14% relative to its 
2005 levels (Xinhua Net, 2010), having met the 2010 target of a 10% cut one year ahead 
of schedule. 
 
3.3 Industrial policies 
In addition to supportive economic policies and market-based environmental instruments, 
governments are exploring industrial policies to promote industrial upgrading and energy 
conservation. With surge in energy use in heavy industry, China’s Ministry of Finance 
and the State Administration of Taxation started levying export taxes from November 
2006 on a variety of energy and resource intensive products to discourage exports of 
those products that rely heavily on energy and resources and to save scarce energy and 
resources. This includes a 5% export tax on oil, coal and coke, a 10% tax on to non-
ferrous metals, some minerals and 27 other iron and steel products, and a 15% tax 
charged on copper, nickel, aluminum and other metallurgical products. Simultaneously, 
imports tariffs on a range of items, including 26 energy and resource products such as oil, 
coal and aluminum, were cut from their current levels of 3-6% to 0-3%. From July 1, 
2007, China’s Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of Taxation (2007) 
eliminated or cut export tax rebates for 2831 exported items. This is considered as the 
boldest move to rein in exports since China joined the World Trade Organization in 
December 2001. Among the affected items, which account for 37% of all traded products, 
are 553 “highly energy-consuming, highly-polluting and resource-intensive products”, 
such as cement, fertilizer and non-ferrous metals, whose export tax rebates were 
completely eliminated. This policy will help to enhance energy efficiency and rationalize 
energy- and resource-intensive sectors as well as to control soaring exports and deflate 
the ballooning trade surplus. From the point of view of leveling the carbon cost playing 
field, such export taxes increase the price at which energy-intensive products made in 
China, such as steel and aluminum, are traded in world markets. For the EU and U.S. 
producers, such export taxes imposed by their major trading partner on these products 
take out at least part, if not all, of the competitive pressure that is at the heart of the 
carbon leakage debates. Being converted into the implicit carbon costs, the estimated 
levels of CO2 price embedded in the Chinese export taxes on steel and aluminium are 
very much in the same range as the average price of the EU allowances over the same 
period. Zhang (2009 and 2010b) have argued that there is a clear need within a climate   18
regime to define comparable efforts towards climate mitigation and adaptation to 
discipline the use of unilateral trade measures at the international level. As exemplified 
by export tariffs that China applied on its own during 2006-08, defining the comparability 
of climate efforts can be to China’s advantage (Zhang, 2010b). 
 
China’s Ministry of Commerce and the SEPA (2007) in October 2007 were in an unusual 
collaboration to jointly issue the antipollution circular. Targeted at its booming export 
industry, this new regulation would suspend the rights of those enterprises that do not 
meet their environmental obligations to engage foreign trade in the period of more than 
one year and less than three years. A significant portion of China’s air pollution can be 
traced directly to the production of goods that are exported. In the Pearl River delta, a 
major manufacturing region in Southern China, as indicated in Figure 1, Streets et al. 
(2006) found that 37% of the total SO2 emissions in the region, 28% of NOx, 24% of 
particulate matter (PM), and 8% of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) are caused by 
export-related activities. In the city of Shenzhen alone, the regional leader in industrial 
development and trade, 75% of VOCs, 71% of PM, 91% of NOx, and 89% of SO2 
emissions from the industrial sector were released in manufacturing of exported goods. 
Effectively implemented, this policy will help polluting enterprises that export their 
products to pay attention to the environmental effects of their products and produce more 
environmentally friendly products. 
 
 
Figure 1  Percentage of Air Pollutants Tied to Export Manufacturing in the Pearl 
River Delta and Shenzhen, China   19















3.4 Environmental performance ratings and disclosure 
The central government is also exploring other ways to enhance the efficacy of 
environmental monitoring and compliance. Naming and shaming polluters is one vehicle. 
In April 2010, China’s MEP for the first time unveiled offending polluters and blacklisted 
state-owned enterprises.
6 Out of 7,043 major polluting enterprises under the national 
environmental monitoring system, 2,713 were found to have discharged substandard 
waste water or exhaust emissions in 2009, accounting for about 40% of the total 
monitored major polluting enterprises. The offending polluters include the state-owned 
China Power Investment Corp, China Huaneng Group and China Guodian Corp, the three 
major national power-generating groups. This fact will help change the general public’s 
perception that it is the small, private enterprises that are the country’s main sources of 
pollution. The listing of some sewage treatment plants was another remarkable sign in the 
report as 47% of 1,587 monitored waste water facilities were found guilty of substandard 
discharges (Deng, 2010).  
 
 
Table 6  Environmental Performance Ratings of the Participating Firms under the 
Green Watch Program in Jiangsu Province, China, 2001-2006 
 
                                                 
6 It is reported that, according to Jairam Ramesh, India Environment Minister, India plans 
to launch a public database of the country’s worst polluters, modeled on a list compiled 
by China (Hille and Lamont, 2010).   20
















































































1 Green is for superior performance; blue for full compliance; yellow for meeting 
major compliance standards but violating some minor requirements; red for violating 
important standards; and black for more extreme non-compliance. 
2 The dates in parentheses are percentage representation of all the participating firms in a 
given year.  
Source: Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council (2007). 
 
 
Governments can go beyond simple naming and shaming polluters by implementing 
environmental performance ratings and disclosure (PRD). The PRD relies on non-
regulatory forces to create incentives for (mainly industrial) facilities to improve 
environmental performance. Some environmental economists call disclosure programs 
the third wave in pollution control policy after the first two waves that are legal 
regulations and market-based instruments, respectively (Tietenberg, 1998). Such 
programs will motivate polluters to reduce emissions, even in developing countries where 
regulatory infrastructures are insufficiently developed or even absent or are subjected to 
corruption, but where enough information can be reliably obtained to provide credible 
performance ratings (Dasgupta et al., 2006; World Bank, 2000). Modeled on Indonesia’s 
successful Program for Pollution Control, Evaluation and Rating (PROPER), the first 
PRD program in developing countries launched in June 1995 (World Bank, 2000), China 
introduced the Green Watch program in Zhengjiang, a relatively well-off city in Jiangsu 
province in June 1999, and Hohhot city, Inner Mongolia. This program develops color-
coded systems to rate corporate environmental performance. The first Green Watch 
ratings were disclosed through the media in 1999. The program was extended from 
Zhenjiang city to all over Jiangsu province in 2001, and to eight other provinces in China 
during 2003-2005. Nationwide implementation of the Green Watch program has been 
promoted since 2005 (Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council, 2007; Jin et al., 
2010). Just like the Indonesian companies under the PROPER program, the companies 
under the Green Watch programs have dramatically changed their corporate 
environmental behavior. The Green Watch program in Jiangsu province indicates both 
increasing participation by firms and improvement in their compliance rates, with the 
number of rated firms increasing more than tenfold, from 1,059 in 2001 to 11,215 in 
2006; and the percentage of firms with positive ratings (green, blue, and yellow)   21
increasing from 83% in 2001 to 90% in 2006 (Table 6). Moreover, the Jiangsu case 
suggests that Green Watch ratings have stronger effects on firms with red ratings 
(moderate noncompliance) than those with black ratings (extreme noncompliance) 
(Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council, 2007; Jin et al., 2010). 
 
3.5 Cooperation with financial institutions 
Drawing the support of financial institutions is another avenue to promote improved 
corporate environmental performance. From April 1, 2007, China’s SEPA works with the 
People’s Bank of China, China’s central bank, on a new credit-evaluation system under 
which companies’ environmental compliance records are incorporated into the bank’s 
credit-evaluation system. This information will serve as a reference for commercial 
banks’ consideration of whether or not to provide loans. The bank could turn down 
requests for loans from firms with poor environmental records (Zhang, 2007a). In mid-
July 2007, the SEPA announced the “green credit” policy jointly with the People’s Bank 
of China and China Banking Regulation Commission. They will work together to enforce 
it, with the financial bodies denying loans to firms that the SEPA identifies as failing to 
meet environmental standards. The SEPA later posted on its web site and notified 
China’s central bank and top banking regulatory commission 30 offending companies 
that will be barred from receiving credits (Xinhua Net, 2007). Some bank branches go 
further. Jiangyin Branch of the People’s Bank of China in Jiangsu province issued the 
color-coded lending guidance, favoring those companies of superior environmental 
performance. For those green-rated companies, banks will enhance their lending scale 
and give priority to their financial needs. By contrast, the lending scale for those red-rated 
ones at best remains current level unless lending is requested for environment-improving 
equipments and technical transformation. Even strict lending condition is attached to 
those black-rated companies. They cannot receive any new borrowing, and if they still 
fail to comply with the environmental regulations within a given period, banks will cut 
their borrowing and in the worst case even they are asked to return all their borrowing 
(Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council, 2007). Clearly, this concerted action by 
the central bank and the SEPA is expected not only to reduce the risks borne by 
commercial banks, but also to encourage companies to think about more about the 
environmental effect of their operation and self-discipline their environmental behavior. 
Currently, aided by the International Finance Corporation, the finance arm of the World 
Bank Group, China is experimenting with the green credit policy in the steel industry in 
Sichuan province (CAEP, 2009). In August 2007, the SEPA (2007b) also clearly 
stipulated that highly polluting enterprises are subject to its auditing of their 
environmental records in case these enterprises want to list shares in the Chinese stock 
markets or get re-financed. China Securities Regulation Commission will incorporate 
information on their environmental auditing into its decision on whether or not to allow 
these enterprises to be listed or get refinanced. Moreover, investors in capital markets can 
be an important ally, reacting to the disclosure of environmental performance related to 
the companies that they invest. The Shanghai Stock Exchange has disclosed 
environmental information since late 2009, in line with rules based on a May 2008 notice 
issued by the exchange to disclose corporate information (Ban, 2008). The reports from 
companies like PetroChina and Sinopec for example are still incomplete, because they 
have just released discharge data, but have no mention of records of violations and the   22
subsequent penalties (Chung, 2010). Anyhow using a stock exchange as a vehicle to 
enhance environmental information disclosure represents the right direction. With the so-
called H-shares from companies incorporated in Mainland China traded on the Hong 
Kong Exchanges and Clearing, it could amend its listing rules to require all those listed 




Confronted with the rising costs and health risks of environmental degradation associated 
with rapid economic growth, China has gradually recognized that the conventional path 
of encouraging economic growth at the expense of the environment cannot be sustained. 
It has to be changed. Accordingly, the central government sets environmental goals and 
environmental performance requirements. However, the environmental regulatory agency 
is ill-equipped either to enforce existing regulations or to design, implement, monitor, 
inspect and enforce new effective environmental polices to fulfill its tasks. This has led to 
poor compliance and weak enforcement. Correcting such a problem requires a major 
investment in strengthening the institutions of environmental governance to ensure that 
they have the adequate institutional, financial and technical capabilities to do the job. 
This is a necessary step, but not enough. Given that China has decentralized in the 
allocation and responsibility and has shifted control over resources and decision making 
to local governments and enterprises as the result of the economic reforms over the past 
three decades, the full participation of all stakeholders is also needed in protecting the 
environment in the context of government decentralization.  
 
In this regard, local government’s cooperation is crucial to the overall outcomes. To that 
end, the central government of China has been using a variety of tactics to incentivize 
local governments. They include placing those cities that meet the specified criteria on 
the honor role (the so-called model environmental city program), publicly naming the 
backlist of “the 10 most polluted cities” and those cities that failed to meet the specified 
environmental standards, having officials hold accountable for major environmental 
accidents, energy saving and pollution cutting in their turfs, releasing the first-ever report 
on economic costs of pollution (the so-called green GDP) to help the general public and 
officials alike to understand how severely China is confronting the rising environmental 
costs and health risks of environmental degradation, establishing the six regional 
environmental protection inspection centers independent of local governments, 
blacklisting those industrial projects (some even being considered the so-called “national 
key projects”) that had not undergone proper EIAs, and suspending those local 
governments’ rights to approve new projects in case there are offenders of environmental 
laws and regulations in their turfs.  
 
However, under the current evaluation criterion for officials in China, local officials 
typically have been promoted based on how fast they expand their local economies. This 
distorted incentive system tempts officials to disregard environmental costs of growth. 
Moreover, objectively speaking, the current fiscal system in China plays a part in driving 
local governments to seek higher GDP growth, because under the current tax-sharing 
system local governments have little choice but to focus on local development and GDP   23
in order to cover a disproportional portion of the government expenditure. Another 
example of the improper tax-sharing scheme in China is related to differentiated tariffs 
mentioned in Section 2. The NDRC ordered provincial governments to raise power tariffs 
for eight energy-guzzling industries from October 1, 2006 onwards, but many local 
governments failed to implement the differentiated tariffs that charge more for companies 
classified as “eliminated types” or “restrained types” in these industries, with 14 of them 
even continuing to offer preferential power tariffs for such industries. Partly for 
strengthening China’s longstanding efforts to restructure its inefficient heavy industries, 
and partly faced with the prospect for the failure to meet the ambitious energy intensity 
target set for 2010, the NDRC and other 5 ministries and agencies jointly ordered utilities 
to stop offering preferential power tariffs to energy-intensive industries by June 10, 2010. 
Such industries will be charged with the punitive, differentiated tariffs. Those utilities 
that fail to implement the differentiated tariffs will have to pay a fine that is five times 
that of differentiated tariffs multiplied by the volume of sold electricity (Zhu, 2010). The 
reason for this failure is the lack of incentive for local governments to implement this 
policy, because all the revenue collected from these additional charges goes to the central 
government. To provide incentive for local governments, these revenue should be 
designed to be assigned to local governments, but the central government requires local 
governments to use the revenue specifically for industrial upgrading, energy saving and 
emissions cutting (Zhang, 2008 and 2010a).  
 
The evidence above suggests the need to carefully examine those objective and subjective 
factors that lead to the lack of local official’s cooperation on the environment, and to 
provide appropriated incentives to get their cooperation. One way to ensure local officials 
realize that they should take their jobs seriously is developing criteria that incorporate 
energy conservation and environmental performance into the overall evaluation of local 
officials’ performances. Something that will affect their promotions. To ensure the 
energy-saving goal to be met under the Top 1000 Enterprises Energy Conservation 
Action Program, achieving energy efficiency improvements has become a criteria for job 
performance evaluations of the heads of these enterprises. This will help them realize that 
they should take their jobs seriously because they have a very real stake in meeting 
energy-saving goals. This should be strengthened, and is extended to have local officials 
to hold accountable for energy saving and pollution cutting in their regions. Evaluation of 
local officials should abandon the unique importance of GDP. Instead, evaluation needs 
to look not only at economic growth of a region, but even more at the model and quality 
of its development. To that end, the central government not only needs to develop criteria 
that incorporate energy conservation and environmental performance into the overall 
evaluation of local officials’ performances, more importantly applies that criteria 
consistently to ensure energy saving and pollution cutting in a rational way to avoid 
current last-minute shutdown operation of factories cross the country for meeting the 
energy-saving goal. 
 
Alleviating the financial burden of local governments is another avenue to incentivize 
them not to eye on economic growth alone. Enlarging their tax revenue is the key to 
helping them cover a disproportional portion of the aforementioned government 
expenditure. The central government really needs to cultivate steady and sizeable sources   24
of revenues for local governments. Enacting property taxes or real estate taxes for local 
governments is urgently needed. In the tax-sharing system adopted in 1994, onshore 
resource taxes are assigned to local governments, while the central government is 
collecting revenues from resource taxes off the shore. In this regard, broadening the 
current coverage of resource taxation and significantly increasing the levied level also 
help to increase local government’s revenues while conserving resources and preserving 
the environment. 
 
China also needs to take serious efforts towards planning and designing nationwide 
functional zoning. In the 11
th five-year economic plan, this nationwide functional zoning 
concept has been sketched out. The underlying basis is that a region can be classified as 
optimized development zone, prioritized development zone, restrained development zone 
or prohibited development zone, depending on its population, resource endowment and 
environmental assimilating capacity. Each functional zoning is given differing 
development objectives. The latter are in turn aligned with different evaluation criteria 
for officials. For a region that needs to develop its industry, evaluation of local officials 
would see how fast they expand their local economies, while a region whose service 
sector needs to develop, evaluation would target the contribution of high-tech value 
added. By contrast, a region whose ecology services need to be preserved, evaluation 
would focus on green GDP. Planning and designing nationwide functional zoning may go 
beyond current administrative regions. Clearly, it is easier said than done. There has not 
since made much progress. But put in place and implemented effectively, a functional 
zoning policy not only helps to correct the current distorted incentive system, more 
importantly puts China towards a more sustainable development path. 
 
The active engagement of the private sector is essential for success as well. After all, the 
enterprises themselves are entities that use natural resources, make products and emit 
pollution. Having the right economic policies is crucial for polluting enterprises to hold 
accountable for their environmental behavior. China needs to get rid of energy subsidies, 
which have been reduced over time but still exist, in order to provide incentives for 
efficient fuel use and adoption of clean technologies that reduce emissions at sources. But 
removing such subsidies is but a first step in getting the energy prices right. Further steps 
include incorporating the costs of resources themselves to reflect their scarcity and 
internalizing the costs of externalities. Currently, resource taxes in China are levied on 
the basis of extracted volume of resources. Starting in 1984, resource taxes have been 
levied at Yuan 2-5 per ton of raw coal and Yuan 8 per ton of coking coal, with the 
weighted average of Yuan 3.5 per ton of coal. For crude oil, the corresponding tax is 
levied at Yuan 8-30 per ton. While the prices of coal and oil have significantly increased 
since 1984, the levels of their resource taxes have remained unchanged over the past 25 
years. As a result, the resource taxes raised amounted to only Yuan 30 billion, accounting 
for about 0.56% of China’s total tax revenues and about 21% of the national government 
expenditure for environmental protection that amounted to Yuan 145 billion in 2008 
(National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2009). Therefore, to avoid wasteful extraction 
and use of resources while alleviating the financial burden of local governments, current 
way in levying taxes on resources in China should be changed. Such taxation should be 
levied based on revenues. In addition, current resource taxes are only levied on seven   25
types of resources including coal, oil and natural gas. This coverage is too narrow, falling 
far short of the purposes of both preserving resources and protecting the environment. 
Thus, overhauling resource taxes also includes broadening their coverage so that more 
resources will be subject to resource taxation. The good news is that the Chinese central 
government started a pilot reform on resource tax in Xinjiang, China’s northwestern 
border area of abundant resources and numerous opportunities for growth and expansion. 
Since June 1, 2010, crude oil and natural gas are taxed by revenues rather than existing 
extracted volume in Xinjiang. While it is enacted as part of a massive support package to 
help Xinjiang achieve leapfrog-like development, which is considered a strategic choice 
to deepen the country’s Western Development Strategy and tap new sources of economic 
growth for China, this new resource tax will help to significantly increase the revenues 
for Xinjiang. It is estimated that the new resource tax levied at a rate of 5% will generate 
additional annual revenues of at least Yuan 3.2 billion for Xinjiang (Liu and Zhang, 
2010). This is a significant increase, in comparison with the total resource tax revenues of 
Yuan 1.1 billion in 2008, inclusive of those from other resources than crude oil and 
natural gas (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2009). This will contribute to about 
15% of the total tax revenues for Xinjiang, in comparison with the current contribution 
level of about 3.8%.    
 
Market-based instruments, such as pollution charges, green taxes, tradeable permits, and 
penalties for infringing on environmental regulations, are common ways to internalize 
externality costs into the market prices. China has traditionally relied on rigid command-
and-control approaches. With the poor environmental performance of such approaches 
and the cost and complexity associated with their implementation, China is increasingly 
implementing market-based policy instruments. The latter are seen to increase not only 
cost-effectiveness but also flexibility in complying with the set environmental regulations. 
In addition, to meet the energy-saving and environmental control goals, China has 
provided supportive economic policies to encourage technical progress and strengthen 
pollution control, and has implemented policies to promote industrial upgrading and 
energy conservation. The country levied export taxes on energy- and resource-intensive 
products to discourage exports of such products that rely heavily on energy and resources 
and to save scarce energy and resources, eliminated or cut export tax rebates for 2831 
exported items including 553 “highly energy-consuming, highly-polluting and resource-
intensive products”, and suspends the rights of those enterprises that do not meet their 
environmental obligations to engage foreign trade in the period of more than one year and 
less than three years. Naming and shaming polluters, rating and disclosing corporate 
environmental performance and drawing the support of financial institutions also serve as 
the important venues to promote long-lasting, improved corporate energy-saving and 
environmental performance. 
 
It should be emphasized that enacting the aforementioned policies and measures targeted 
for energy saving and pollution cutting just signals a goodwill and determination of 
China. Whether to achieve the desired outcomes depends on whether they are strictly 
implemented. It has been stipulated that leaders of local governments and heads of key 
state-owned enterprises are held accountable for energy saving and pollution cutting in 
their turfs, and that achieving the goals of energy efficiency improvements and pollution   26
reductions has become a key component of their job performance evaluations. But no 
senior officials have been reported to take the responsibility for failing to meet the 
energy-saving and pollution-cutting targets, not to mention to step down from their 
positions on these grounds, except for the Mayor of Beijing municipality and the 
Governor of Shanxi province who stepped down for the mismanagement of the severe 
acute respiratory syndrome epidemic and ultra coal-mining accidents. Another example is 
the enforcement of FGD operation to ensure that those generation units with FGD facility 
always use it. It was reported that “up to 40% of those generation units with FGD facility 
did not use it” (Liu, 2006). Given that FGD costs are estimated to account for about 10% 
of the power generation cost (Peng, 2005), this should not come as a surprise, unless 
there is adequate enforcement. With the portion of coal-fired generation capacity with 
FGD increasing, the government desulphurization policy should switch from mandating 
the installation of FGD to focusing on enforcing units with FGD to operate through on-
line monitoring and control. There are encouraging signs that the Chinese government is 
taking steps in this direction. For example, in its 2008 assessment of the total volume 
reduction of major pollutants, the MEP found that FGD facilities of five coal-fired power 
plants were either in improper operation or their on-line monitoring and control data were 
false. These plants were ordered to return the compensation for their desulphurization 
costs in proportion to the time when their FGD facilities were not in operation and to 
make necessary adjustments in the specified period (K. Zhang, 2009).   
 
It should be kept in mind that broad economic reforms can also help to reduce pollution 
and save energy. As China and many other Asian countries are based on export-oriented 
economies, greater openness to trade and the elimination of trade barriers between and 
inside countries can enhance incentives for companies to adopt more efficient and 
environmentally friendly technologies. As trade liberalization progresses, companies are 
facing ever-increasing pressures to be held accountable for their environmental behavior. 
Moreover, state-owned companies in this region are often heavy polluters, so 
decentralization and privatization to have such companies accountable for their profits 
and costs can contribute to cleaner production. But economic reforms are no panacea. 
Governments also need to anticipate and deal with potential environmental effects of 
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